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A commentary on
Oscillatory Neuronal Activity Reflects Lexical-Semantic Feature Integration within and across
Sensory Modalities in Distributed Cortical Networks
by van Ackeren, M. J., Schneider, T. R., Musch, K., and Rueschemeyer, S.-A. (2014). J. Neurosci. 34,
14318–14323. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0958-14.2014
INTRODUCTION
Semantic knowledge relies on widely distributed brain networks. According to embodied
semantics, retrieving features associated to words reactivate the sensory systems used during the
encoding of the objects or entities they refer to Barsalou (2008). This does not preclude that
semantic knowledge is organized hierarchically from modality-specific brain regions to higher-
level, “convergence zones” or “hubs” (Meyer and Damasio, 2009). This organization could provide
the necessary dynamic neural network for flexible lexical-semantic representations (Willems and
Casasanto, 2011), although it could alternatively be interpreted in favor of amodal abstract
representations (Mahon, 2015). Nevertheless, to what extent are these regions differentially
activated and functionally participate to context-directed semantic integration? Eventually, which
parts of this network are fundamentally modal, cross-modal, or amodal, and what is the specific
role of the anterior temporal lobe (ATL), remains an area of debate.
PARADIGM AND MAIN RESULTS
In a recent study published in the Journal of Neuroscience, van Ackeren et al. (2014) attempted to
determine whether words are processed differently when read in the context of words strongly
associated with particular sensory modalities. Authors used magnetoencephalographic (MEG)
recordings and a dual property verification task, in which two feature words were followed by
a target word. Feature words either referred to a single modality (modality-specific or MS, e.g.,
“red,” “big”; i.e., vision), or different modalities (cross-modal or CM, e.g., “red,” “loud”; i.e.,
vision/audition). The subject’s task was to evaluate if feature words were appropriate descriptors
of the target.
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Van Ackeren et al. (2014) focused on oscillatory activity across
a wide range of frequencies (from 2 to 150Hz) during the
processing of the target word. In the high frequencies (gamma
range: 80–120Hz), early enhanced power (150–350ms) was
observed for the MS>CM contrast in a cluster of occipito-
temporal sensors. In contrast, in the low frequencies (theta range:
2–8Hz), late effects (580–1000ms) were found with enhanced
power for CM>MS primes in a cluster of left-lateralized sensors.
DISCUSSION
First of all, the authors’ underlying hypothesis is that if a
target word automatically activates all of its associated semantic
features, the prior integration of feature words, whether MS
or CM, should not influence the processing of the target
word. However, the theoretical assumption associated with
this paradigm—that target word processing reflects time-locked
integration of feature words—needs to be carefully handled.
In such a paradigm, feature words are most probably being
processed during their presentation. This supposedly activates
different networks, in turn influencing the processing of a
subsequent word. Although enhanced theta oscillations in
CM condition might reflect residual far-reaching connections
between areas (van Ackeren and Rueschemeyer, 2014), what is
going on within these distributed networks as feature words
are being integrated with each other is kept aside. One could
already expect differences, whether evoked or induced, related to
the second feature word presentation and whether both words
refer to the same or different modalities (e.g., N400, Kutas and
Federmeier, 2011).
The main result discussed in van Ackeren et al. (2014) is
that opposite gamma and theta effects both originate in left
ATL. It suggests ATL sensitivity to cross-modality, which is
consistent with its anatomical connections to sensory areas.
However, ATL present fine-grained subdivisions, whose function
might differ (Bonner and Price, 2013). Which part of the ATL
is functionally involved in combining specifically auditory-visual
information relative to general multimodal semantic information
thus remains to be clarified. Accordingly, how do these results
relate to the “amodality” of the ATL? An amodal hub should
be insensitive to any modality of a word’s features (haptic,
olfactory, etc.) and to stimulus input modality (pictures, sounds,
etc.), which was not tested here. In this regard, ATL but also
the precuneus (Fairhall and Caramazza, 2013), the posterior
part of MTG, the angular gyrus (Binder et al., 2009), or the
right ATL (Jefferies, 2013) are all valid candidates. Moreover, an
amodal hub should present the ability to generalize across several
instantiations of the same concept. This implies connecting
with other brain areas to form a dynamic network within
which relevant core features will be extracted. This “neuronal
assembly” view for memory traces clearly contrasts with the task
at hand, dealing with on the spot features “integration”, i.e., with
integrating features that can be related to the target concept but
are probably not its core features. Still, van Ackeren et al. propose
two distinct mechanisms for combining information, according
to the modality(ies) they relate to. This promising mechanistic
framework could well underlie new features learning.
However, any hypothesis about network dynamics falls short,
as authors did not explicitly study interactions between the
involved brain regions. Effective connectivity analyses could
shed light on the organization of the semantic network, from
sensory systems toward potential hubs. If the ATL is indeed a
“convergence zone,” then its activity should be highly related
to “features zones” (Patterson et al., 2007; Coutanche and
Thompson-Schill, 2014). In particular, authors report similar
gamma activity between sensory areas and ATL. As information
is progressively being processed and integrated, activities should
become coherent, which could be assessed via Phase-Locking
Value or any other coherence measure. Such analyses could also
help determining the direction of the late theta effect: integration
from sensory systems—retrieving the concept—or reaching out
to other brain networks—activating other features (McNorgan
et al., 2011). Moreover, measures of cross-frequency phase-
amplitude coupling in the ATL could add valuable insight on
the relationship between the effects reported in gamma and theta
frequency bands (see Canolty et al., 2006).
Van Ackeren et al.’s study of oscillatory patterns within
and across neural networks provides precious evidence
on the functional dynamics of semantic integration. In
particular, it proposes an interesting mechanistic framework for
semantic integration through oscillatory modulations. Studying
synchronization between putative hubs and features zones
could potentially enrich the embodiment debate. Then, to what
extent the mechanistic differences observed can be reconciled
with amodal properties of ATL still needs further investigation.
The similar integration of feature names and features per se
should also be examined to disentangle lexical-semantic from
multi-sensory processing and shed light on representations
content.
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